From Constraints to Resolution Rules, Part I: Conceptual Framework by Berthier, Denis
 
 
From Constraints to Resolution Rules 
Part I : conceptual framework 
 
Denis Berthier 
Institut Telecom ; Telecom & Management SudParis 
9 rue Charles Fourier, 91011 Evry Cedex, France 
 
Abstract: Many real world problems appear naturally as 
constraints satisfaction problems (CSP), for which very efficient 
algorithms are known. Most of these involve the combination of two 
techniques: some direct propagation of constraints between 
variables (with the goal of reducing their sets of possible values) 
and some kind of structured search (depth-first, breadth-first,…). 
But when such blind search is not possible or not allowed or when 
one wants a “constructive” or a “pattern-based” solution, one must 
devise more complex propagation rules instead. In this case, one 
can introduce the notion of a candidate (a “still possible” value for 
a variable). Here, we give this intuitive notion a well defined logical 
status, from which we can define the concepts of a resolution rule 
and a resolution theory. In order to keep our analysis as concrete as 
possible, we illustrate each definition with the well known Sudoku 
example. Part I proposes a general conceptual framework based on 
first order logic; with the introduction of chains and braids,  Part II 
will give much deeper results. 
Keywords: constraint satisfaction problem, knowledge engineering, 
production system, resolution rule, strategy, Sudoku solving. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many real world problems, such as resource allocation, 
temporal reasoning or scheduling, naturally appear as constraint 
satisfaction problems (CSP) [1, 2]. Such problems constitute a 
main sub-area of Artificial Intelligence (AI). A CSP is defined 
by a finite number of variables with values in some fixed 
domains and a finite set of constraints (i.e. of relations they must 
satisfy); it consists of finding a value for each of these variables, 
such that they globally satisfy all the constraints.  
A CSP states the constraints a solution must satisfy, i.e. it says 
what is desired. It does not say anything about how a solution 
can be obtained. But very efficient general purpose algorithms 
are known [1], which guarantee that they will find a solution if 
any. Most of these algorithms involve the combination of two 
very different techniques: some direct propagation of constraints 
between variables (in order to reduce their sets of possible 
values) and some kind of structured search with “backtracking” 
(depth-first, breadth-first,…), consisting of trying (recursively if 
necessary) a value for a variable, propagating the consequences 
of this tentative choice and eventually reaching a solution or a 
contradiction allowing to conclude that this value is impossible.  
But, in some cases, such blind search is not possible (for 
practical reasons, e.g. one wants to simulate human behaviour 
or one is not in a simulator but in real life) or not allowed (for 
theoretical or æsthetic reasons, or because one wants to 
understand what happens, as is the case with most Sudoku 
players) or one wants a “constructive” solution.  
In such situations, it is convenient to introduce the notion of 
a candidate, i.e. of a “still possible” value for a variable. But a 
clear definition and a logical status must first be given to this 
intuitive notion. When this is done, one can define the 
concepts of a resolution rule (a logical formula in the 
“condition => action” form, which says what to do in some 
observable situation described by the condition pattern), a 
resolution theory, a resolution strategy. One can then study 
the  relation between the original CSP problem and various of 
its resolution theories. One can also introduce several 
properties a resolution theory can have, such as confluence (in 
Part II) and completeness (contrary to general purpose 
algorithms, a resolution theory cannot in general solve all the 
instances of a given CSP; evaluating its scope is thus a new 
topic in its own). This “pattern-based” approach was first 
introduced in [3], in the limited context of Sudoku solving. 
Notice that resolution rules are typical of the kind of rules 
that can be implemented in an inference engine and resolution 
theories can be seen as “production systems” [4]. See Part II. 
 
In this paper, we deal only with the case of a finite number 
of variables with ranges in finite domains and with first order 
constraints (i.e. constraints between the variables, not between 
subsets of variables). 
This paper is self-contained, both for the general concepts 
and for their illustrations with the Sudoku example, although 
deeper results specific to the introduction of chains or to this 
example will appear in Part II. Section II introduces the first 
order logical formulation of a general CSP. Section III defines 
the notion of a candidate and analyses its logical status. 
Section IV can then define resolution rules, resolution paths, 
resolution theories and the notion of a pure logic constructive 
solution. Section V explains in what sense a resolution theory 
can be incomplete even if its rules seem to express all the 
constraints in the CSP. 
 
 
II. THE LOGICAL THEORY ASSOCIATED WITH A CSP 
Consider a fixed CSP for n variables x1, x2, …, xn in finite 
domains X1, X2, …, Xn, with first order constraints. The CSP can 
obviously be written as a First Order Logic (FOL) theory (i.e. as 
a set of FOL axioms expressing the constraints) [1]. Thanks to 
the equivalence between FOL and Multi-Sorted First Order 
Logic (MS-FOL) [5], it can also be written as an MS-FOL 
theory. CSP solutions are in one-to-one correspondence with 
MS-FOL models of this theory. 
In MS-FOL, for each domain Xk, one introduces a sort (i.e. a 
type) Xk (there can be no confusion in using the same letter for 
the sort and the domain) and a predicate valuek(xk), with 
intended meaning “the value of the k-th variable is xk”. All the 
basic functions and predicates necessary to express the given 
constraints are defined formally as being sorted, so that one 
doesn’t have to write explicit conditions about the sorts of the 
variables mentioned in a formulæ. This has many advantages in 
practice (such as keeping formulæ short). The formulæ of our 
MS-FOL theory are defined as usual, by induction (combining 
atomic formulæ built on the above basic predicates and functions 
with logical connectives: and, or, not, typed quantifiers). We can 
always suppose that, for each value a variable can have, there is 
a constant symbol of the appropriate sort to name it. We can also 
adopt a unique names assumption for constant symbols: two 
different constant symbols of the same sort do not designate the 
same entity. However, no unique names assumption is made for 
variables. With the following Sudoku example, details missing 
in the above two paragraphs will hopefully become clearer than 
through additional logical formalism. 
A.  The Sudoku CSP 
Sudoku is generally presented as follows (Fig. 1): given a 9x9 
grid, partially filled with numbers from 1 to 9 (the “entries” or 
“clues” or “givens” of the problem), complete it with numbers 
from 1 to 9 in such a way that in each of the nine rows, in each 
of the nine columns and in each of the nine disjoint blocks of 3x3 
contiguous cells, the following property holds: there is at most 
one occurrence of each of these numbers. Notice that this is a 
special case of the Latin Squares problem (which has no 
constraints on blocks).  
It is natural to consider the three dimensional space with 
coordinates (n, r, c) and any of the 2D spaces: rc, rn and cn.  
Moreover, in rc-space, due to the constraint on blocks, it is 
convenient to introduce an alternative block-square coordinate 
system [b, s] and variables Xbs such that Xrc = Xbs whenever (r, 
c) and [b, s] are the coordinates of the same cell. For symmetry 
reasons, in addition to these variables with values in Numbers, 
we define additional Xrn, Xcn and Xbn variables, with values, 
respectively in Rows, Columns and Squares, and such that:  
Xrc = n ⇔ Xrn = c  ⇔ Xcn = r   ⇔ Xbn = s. 
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Figure 1: A typical Sudoku puzzle 
 
Since rows, columns and blocks play similar roles in the 
defining constraints, they will naturally appear to do so in 
many other places and it is convenient to introduce a word 
that makes no difference between them: a unit is either a row 
or a column or a block. And we say that two rc-cells share a 
unit if they are either in the same row or in the same column 
or in the same block (where “or” is non exclusive). We also 
say that these two cells are linked. It should be noticed that 
this (symmetric) relation between two cells does not depend 
in any way on the content of these cells but only on their 
place in the grid; it is therefore a straightforward and quasi 
physical notion. 
Formulating the Sudoku CSP as an MS-FOL theory is done 
in three stages: Grid Theory, General Sudoku Theory, 
Specific Sudoku Puzzle Theory. For definiteness, we consider 
standard Sudoku only, on a 9x9 grid. 
Most CSP problems can similarly be decomposed into three 
components: axioms for a general and static context (here, the 
grid) valid for all the instances of the problem, axioms for the 
general CSP constraints expressed in this context (here, the 
Sudoku constraints) and axioms for specific instances of the 
problem (here, the entries of a puzzle). 
B.  Grid Theory 
B.1 The sorts in Grid Theory 
The characteristic of MS-FOL is that it assumes the world 
of interest is composed of different types of objects, called 
sorts. In the very limited world of Grid Theory (GT) and of 
Sudoku Theory (ST), we need only five sorts: Number, Row, 
Column, Block, Square. Row, Column and Block correspond 
in the obvious way to rows, columns and blocks, whereas 
Square corresponds to the relative position of a cell in a block. 
Attached to each sort, there are two sets of symbols, one for 
naming constant objects of this sort, and one for naming 
variables of this sort. In the GT case, the variables for 
Numbers are n, n’, n’’, n0, n1, n2, …; the constants for 
Numbers are 1n, 2n, 3n, 4n, 5n, 6n, 7n, 8n, 9n. The variables for 
Rows are , r’, r’’, r0, r1, r2, ……; the constants for Rows are 1r, 
2r, 3r, 4r, 5r, 6r, 7r, 8r, 9r. And similarly for the other sorts. For 
 
 
each of the first five sorts, obvious axioms can express the range 
of the variable of this sort and the unique names assumption. 
In conformance with the MS-FOL conventions, a quantifier 
such as “∀r” (resp. “∀c”, “∀n”, …) will always mean “for any 
row r” (resp. “for any column c”, “for any number n”, …) 
B.2 Function and predicate symbols of Grid Theory 
Grid Theory has no function symbol. In addition to the five 
equality predicate symbols (=n, =r,… one for each sort), it has 
only one predicate symbol: correspondence, with arity 4 and 
signature (Row, Column, Block, Square), with intended meaning 
for atomic formulæ “correspondence(r, c, b, s)” the natural one. 
Given these basic predicates, one can define auxiliary predicates, 
considered as shorthands for longer logical formulæ:  
– same-row, with signature (Row, Column, Row, Column); 
“same-row(r1, c1, r2, c2)” is defined as a shorthand for: r1 =r r2; 
– and similarly for same-column and same-block; 
– same-cell, with signature (Row, Column, Row, Column); 
“same-cell(r1, c1, r2, c2)” is defined as a shorthand for: r1 = r r2 & 
c1 = c c2; 
As they have been defined, the auxiliary predicates same-row, 
same-column, same-block and same-cell all have the same arity 
and signature: informally, they all apply to couples of cells with 
row-column coordinates. This is very important because it 
allows to define an auxiliary predicate with the same arity and 
signature, applying to couples of cells with row-column 
coordinates, independent of the type of unit they share (we shall 
see that, most of the time, this type is irrelevant): 
– share-a-unit, with signature (Row, Column, Row, 
Column); “share-a-unit(r1, c1, r2, c2)” is defined as a shorthand 
for: ¬same-cell(r1, c1, r2, c2) & [ same-row(r1, c1, r2, c2) or same-
column(r1, c1, r2, c2) or same-block(r1, c1, r2, c2)]. 
Of course, the intended meaning of this predicate is that 
suggested by its name: the two cells share either a row or a 
column or a block; notice that a cell is not considered as sharing 
a unit with itself. 
B.3 Axioms of Grid Theory 
In addition to the 5x36 sort axioms, Grid Theory has 81 
axioms expressing the (r, c) to [b, s] correspondence of 
coordinate systems, such as “correspondence(1r, 1c, 1b, 1s)”. 
As an exercise, one can check that this is enough to define the 
grid (modulo renamings of rows, columns, …). One can also 
check that the following formula expresses that row r intersects 
block b: ∃c∃s correspondence(r, c, b, s). 
C.  General Sudoku Theory 
General Sudoku Theory (ST) is defined as an extension of 
Grid Theory. It has the same sorts as GT. In addition to the 
predicates of GT, it has the following one:  value, with signature 
(Number, Row, Column); the intended meaning of atomic 
formula “value(n, r, c)” is that number n is the value of cell 
(r, c), i.e. indifferently: Xrc = n, Xrn = c, Xcn = r or Xbn = s. It is 
convenient to introduce an auxiliary predicate value[], written 
with square braces, with signature (Number, Block, Square), 
with the same meaning as value, but in [b, s] instead of (r, c) 
coordinates; “value[n, b, s]” is defined as a shorthand for: 
∃r∃c [correspondence(r, c, b, s) & value(n, r, c)] 
C.1 Axioms of Sudoku Theory 
ST contains the axioms of GT, plus the following, written 
in a symmetrical form that will be useful in the sequel. 
STrc: ∀r∀c∀n1∀n2{value(n1, r, c) & value(n2, r, c) ⇒ n1 = n2} 
STrn: ∀r∀n∀c1∀c2{value(n, r, c1) & value(n, r, c2) ⇒ c1 = c2} 
STcn: ∀c∀n∀r1∀r2{value(n, r1, c) & value(n, r2, c) ⇒ r1 = r2} 
STbn: ∀b∀n∀s1∀s2{value[n, b, s1] & value[n, b, s2] ⇒ s1 = s2} 
EVrc: ∀r∀c∃n value(n, r, c)  
EVrn: ∀r∀n∃c value(n, r, c)  
EVcn: ∀c∀n∃r value(n, r, c)  
EVbn: ∀b∀n∃s value[n, b, s]. 
The formal symmetries inside each of these two groups of 
four axioms must be noticed. STrc expresses that an rc-cell 
can have only one value (this is never stated explicitly, but 
this should not be forgotten). STrn (resp. STcn, STbn) expresses 
that a value can appear only once in a row (resp. a column, a 
block); these are the standard constraints. Axiom EVrc (resp. 
EVrn, EVcn and EVbn) expresses that, in a solution, every rc- 
(resp. rn-, cn and bn-) cell must have a value; these conditions 
generally remain implicit in the usual formulation of Sudoku. 
D.  Specific Sudoku Puzzle Theory 
In order to be consistent with various sets of entries, ST 
includes no axioms on specific values. With any specific 
puzzle P we can associate the axiom EP defined as the finite 
conjunction of the set of all the ground atomic formulæ 
“value(nk, ri, cj)” such that there is an entry of P asserting that 
number nk must occupy cell (ri, cj). Then, when added to the 
axioms of ST, axiom EP defines the MS-FOL theory of the 
specific puzzle P. 
From the point of view of first order logic, everything is 
said. A solution of puzzle P (if any) is a model (if any) of 
theory ST + EP. The only problem is that nothing yet is said 
about how a solution can be found. This is the reason for 
introducing candidates and resolution rules. 
III. CANDIDATES AND THEIR LOGICAL STATUS 
A.  Candidates 
If one considers the way Sudoku players solve puzzles, it 
appears that most of them introduce candidates in the form of 
“pencil marks” in the cells of the grid. Intuitively, a candidate 
is a “still possible” value for a cell; candidates in each cell are 
progressively eliminated during the resolution process.  
 
 
This very general notion can be introduced for any CSP 
problem. Unfortunately, it has no a priori meaning from the MS-
FOL point of view. The reason is not the non-monotonicity of 
candidates, i.e. that they are progressively  withdrawn whereas 
one can only add information by applying the axioms of a FOL 
theory: this could easily be dealt with by introducing non-
candidates (or impossible values) instead. The real reason is that 
the intuitive notion of a candidate (as a “still possible” value) 
and the way it is used in practice suppose a logic in which this 
idea of “still possible” is formalised. Different “states of 
knowledge” must then be considered – and this is typically the 
domain of epistemic logic. We shall therefore adopt a priori the 
following framework, supporting a natural epistemic 
interpretation of a candidate.  
For each variable xk of the CSP, let us introduce a predicate 
candk(xk) with intended meaning “the value xk from domain Xk is 
not yet known to be impossible for the k-th variable”. 
The interesting point is that we shall be able to come back to 
ordinary (though constructivist or intuitionistic) logic for 
candidates (and thus forget the complexities of epistemic logic). 
B.  Knowledge states and knowledge space 
Given a fixed CSP, define a knowledge state as any set of 
values and candidates (formally written as valuek and candk 
predicates). A knowledge state is intended to represent the 
totality of the ground atomic facts (in terms of values and 
candidates) that are present in some possible state of reasoning 
for some instance of the CSP. (Invariant background knowledge, 
such as grid facts in Sudoku, is not explicitly included).  
It should be underlined that this notion of a knowledge state 
has a very concrete and intuitive meaning: for instance, in 
Sudoku, it represents the situation on a grid with candidates at 
some point in some resolution process for some puzzle; this is 
usually named the PM, the “Pencil Marks”. (Notice that some 
knowledge states may be contradictory – so that inconsistent sets 
of entries can be dealt with).  
Let KS be the (possibly large, but always finite) set of all 
possible knowledge states. On KS, we define the following order 
relation: KS1 ≤ KS2 if and only if, for any constant x° (of sort X) 
one has: 
– if valueX(x°) is in KS1, then valueX(x°) is in KS2, 
– if candX(x°) is in KS2, then candX(x°) is in KS1. 
If “KS1 ≤ KS2” is intuitively interpreted as “KS2 may appear 
after KS1 in some resolution process”, these conditions express 
the very intuitive idea that values can only be added and 
candidates can only be deleted during a resolution process. 
For any instance P of the CSP (e.g. for any puzzle P), one can 
also define the initial knowledge state KSP corresponding to the 
starting point of any resolution process for P. Its values are all 
the entries of P; its candidates are all the possible values of the 
remaining variables. The set KSP = {KS / KSP ≤ KS} is thus 
the set of knowledge states one can reach when starting from 
P; we call it the epistemic model of P. 
C.  Knowledge states and epistemic logic 
The above notion of a knowledge state appears to be a 
particular case of the general concept of a possible world in 
modal logic; the order relation on the set of knowledge states 
corresponds to the accessibility relation between possible 
worlds and our notion of an epistemic model coincides with 
that of a Kripke model [6]. Let K be the “epistemic operator”, 
i.e. the formal logical operator corresponding to knowing (for 
any proposition A, KA denotes the proposition “it is known 
that A” or “the agent under consideration knows that A”). 
Then, for any proposition A, we have Hintikka’s 
interpretation of KA [7]: in any possible world compatible 
with what is known (i.e. accessible from the current one), it is 
the case that A. 
Several axiom systems have appeared for epistemic logic 
(in increasing order of strength: S4 < S4.2 < S4.3 < S4.4 < 
S5). Moreover, it is known that there is a correspondence 
between the axioms on the epistemic operator K and the 
properties of the accessibility relation between possible 
worlds (this is a form of the classical relationship between 
syntax and semantics). As the weakest S4 logic is enough for 
our purposes, we won’t get involved in the debates about the 
best axiomatisation. S4 formalises the following three axioms: 
– KA ⇒ A: “if a proposition is known then it is true” or 
“only true propositions can be known”; it means that we are 
speaking of knowledge and not of belief and this supposes the 
agent (our CSP solver) does not make false inferences; this 
axiom corresponds to the accessibility relation being reflexive 
(for all KS in KS, one has: KS ≤ KS); 
– KA ⇒ KKA: (reflection) if a proposition is known 
then it is known to be known (one is aware of what one 
knows); this axiom corresponds to the accessibility relation 
being transitive (for all KS1, KS2 and KS3 in KS, one has: if 
KS1 ≤ KS2 and KS2 ≤ KS3, then KS1 ≤ KS3); 
– K(A ⇒ B) ⇒ (KA ⇒ KB): (limited deductive closure 
of knowledge) if it is known that A ⇒ B, then if it is known 
that A, then it is known that B. In the case of CSP, this will be 
applied as follows: when a resolution rule [A ⇒ B] is known 
[K(A ⇒ B)], if its conditions [A] are known to be satisfied 
[KA] then its conclusions [B] are known to be satisfied [KB]. 
D.  Values and candidates 
As we want our resolution rules to deal with candidates, all 
our initial MS-FOL concepts must be re-interpreted in the 
context of epistemic logic. 
The entries of the problem P are not only true in the initial 
knowledge state KSP, they are known to be true in this state: 
 
 
they must be written as Kvaluek; similarly, the initial candidates 
for a variable are not only the a priori possible values for it; they 
must be interpreted as not yet known to be impossible: 
¬K¬cand. 
Moreover, as a resolution rule must be effective, it must 
satisfy the following: a condition on the absence of a candidate 
must mean that it is effectively known to be impossible: 
K¬cand; a condition on the presence of a candidate must mean 
that it is not effectively known to be impossible: ¬K¬cand; a 
conclusion on the assertion of a value must mean that this value 
becomes effectively known to be true: Kvalue; a conclusion on 
the negation of a candidate must mean that this candidate 
becomes effectively known to be impossible: K¬cand. 
As a result, in a resolution rule, a predicate “valuek” will never 
appear alone but only in the construct “Kvaluek(xk)”; a predicate 
“candk” will never appear alone but only in the construct 
¬K¬candk (given that K¬candk is equivalent, in any modal 
theory, to ¬¬K¬candk).  
All this entails that we can use well known correspondences 
of modal logic S4 with intuitionistic logic [9] and constructive 
logic [10] to “forget” the K operator (thus merely replacing 
everywhere “Kvaluek” with “valuek” and “¬K¬candk” with 
“candk”), provided that we consider that we are now using 
intuitionistic or constructive logic. We have thus eliminated the 
epistemic operator that first appeared necessary to give the 
notion of a candidate a well defined logical status. Said 
otherwise: at the very moderate price of using intuitionnistic or 
constructive logic, in spite of the fact that candidates can be 
given an epistemic status, no explicit epistemic operator will 
ever be needed in the logical formulation of resolution rules. 
One thing remains to be clarified: the relation between values 
and candidates. In the epistemic interpretation, a value ak for a 
variable xk is known to be true if and only if all the other 
possible values for this variable are known to be false: 
∀xk [Kvaluek(xk) ⇔ ∀x’k≠ xk  K¬candk(x’k)]. 
Using the equivalence between K¬ and ¬¬K¬ and forgetting 
the K operator as explained above, we get the value-to-
candidate-relation intuitionistic axiom, for each variable xk:  
VCRk: ∀xk [valuek(xk) ⇔  ∀x’k≠ xk¬candk(x’k)]. 
IV.  RESOLUTION RULES AND  RESOLUTION THEORIES 
A.  General definitions 
Definiton: a formula in the MS-FOL language of a CSP is in 
the condition-action form if it is written as A ⇒ B, possibly 
surrounded with quantifiers, where A does not contain explicitly 
the “⇒” sign and B is a conjunction of value predicates and of 
negated cand predicates (no disjunction is allowed in B); all the 
variables appearing in B must already appear in A and be 
universally quantified.  
Definitons: a formula in the condition-action form is a 
resolution rule for a CSP if it is an intuitionistically (or 
constructively) valid consequence of the CSP axioms and of 
VCR. A resolution theory for a CSP is a set of resolution 
rules. Given a resolution theory T, a resolution path in T for 
an instance P of the CSP is a sequence of knowledge states 
starting with P and such that each step is justified by a rule in 
T. A resolution theory T solves an instance P of the CSP if 
one can exhibit a resolution path in T leading to a solution. 
Notice that, contrary to the general notion of a solution of a 
CSP as any model of the associated FOL or MS-FOL theory, 
this is a restrictive definition of a solution; it can be called a 
constructive definition of a solution: a resolution theory solves 
an instance of the CSP only if it does so in the constructive 
way defined above. 
B.  The Basic Resolution Theory of a CSP 
For any CSP, there is a Universal Resolution Theory, URT, 
defined as the union of the following three types of rules, 
which are the mere re-writing of each of the VCRk axioms, 
for each sort: 
– Elementary Constraints Propagation rule for sort Xk:  
ECPk: ∀xk∀xk1≠xk {valuek(xk)  ⇒  ¬candk(xk1)}; 
– “Singles” rule for sort Xk: 
Sk: ∀xk{[candk(xk1) & ∀xk1≠xk ¬candk(xk1)] ⇒ valuek(xk)}. 
– Contradiction Detection for sort Xk:  
CDk: ∀xk(¬value(xk) & ¬candk(xk)) ⇒ ⊥, where “⊥” is any 
false formula. 
But for any CSP, there is also a Basic Resolution Theory, 
BRT, which is the union of URT with all the rules specific to 
this CSP expressing the direct contradictions (if any) between 
its different variables (see Part II). All the resolution theories 
we shall consider will be extensions of this BRT. 
C.  Example from Sudoku 
The BRT of the Sudoku CSP (say BSRT) consists of the 
following rules. The elementary constraints propagation 
(ECP) rules are the re-writing of the left-to-right part of 
axioms STrc, STbn, STcn and STbn in the condition-action form: 
ECP1: ∀r∀c∀n∀n1≠n {value(n, r, c)  ⇒  ¬cand(n1, r, c)} 
ECP2: ∀r∀n∀c∀c1≠c {value(n, r, c)  ⇒ ¬cand(n, r, c1)} 
ECP3: ∀c∀n∀r∀r1≠r {value(n, r, c)  ⇒ ¬cand(n, r1, c)} 
ECP4: ∀b∀n∀s∀s1≠s {value[n, b, s]  ⇒ ¬cand[n, b, s1)} 
Here cand[] is related to cand() in the same way as 
value[] was related to value(). 
The well-known rules for Singles (“Naked-Singles” and 
“Hidden-Singles”) are the re-writing of the right-to-left part of 
the same axioms: 
NS: ∀r∀c∀n{ [cand(n, r, c) & ∀n1≠n ¬cand(n1, r, c)] 
⇒ value(n, r, c)} 
 
 
HSrn: ∀r∀n∀c{ [cand(n, r, c) & ∀c1≠c ¬cand(n, r, c1)] 
⇒ value(n, r, c)} 
HScn: ∀c∀n∀r{ [cand(n, r, c) & ∀r1≠r ¬cand(n, r1, c)] 
⇒ value(n, r, c)} 
HSbn: ∀b∀n∀s{ [cand’[n, b, s] & ∀s1≠s ¬ cand’[n, b, s1] ] 
⇒ value’[n, b, s]} 
Axioms EV have a special translation, with meaning: if there 
is a (rc-, rn- cn- or bn-) cell for which no value remains possible, 
then the problem has no solution: 
CDrc: ∃r∃c∀n[¬value(n, r, c) & ¬cand(n, r, c)] ⇒ ⊥. 
CDrn: ∃r∃n∀c[¬value(n, r, c) & ¬cand(n, r, c)] ⇒ ⊥. 
CDcn: ∃c∃n∀r[¬value(n, r, c) & ¬cand(n, r, c)] ⇒ ⊥. 
CDbn: ∃b∃n∀s[¬value’(n, b, s) & ¬cand’(n, b, s)] ⇒ ⊥. 
V.  COMPLETENESS 
A.  Completeness 
Now that the main concepts are defined, we can ask: what 
does it mean for a Resolution Theory T for a given CSP to be 
“complete”? Notice that all the results that can be produced (i.e. 
all the values that can be asserted and all the candidates that can 
be eliminated) when a resolution theory T is applied to a given 
instance P of the CSP are logical consequences of theory T ∪ EP 
(where EP is the conjunction of the entries for P); these results 
must be valid for any solution for P (i.e. for any model of T ∪ 
EP). Therefore a resolution theory can only solve instances of the 
CSP that have a unique solution and one can give three sensible 
definitions of the completeness of T: 1) it solves all the instances 
that have a unique solution; 2) for any instance, it finds all the 
values common to all its solutions; 3) for any instance, it finds all 
the values common to all its solutions and it eliminates all the 
candidates that are excluded by any solution. 
Obviously, the third definition implies the second, which 
implies the first, but whether the converse of any of these two 
implications is true in general remains an open question. 
B.  Why a Basic Resolution Theory may not be enough 
In the case of Sudoku, one may think that the obvious 
resolution rules of BSRT are enough to solve any puzzle. After 
all, don’t they express all that there is in the axioms? It is 
important to understand in what sense they are not enough and 
why. 
These rules are not enough because our notion of a solution 
within a resolution theory T a priori restricts them to being used 
constructively; said otherwise, we look only for models of T 
obtained constructively from the rules in T; but a solution of a 
CSP is any model of the original axioms, whether it is obtained 
in a constructive way or not (it may need some “guessing”). 
To evaluate how far these rules are from being enough, they 
have been implemented in an inference engine (CLIPS) and a 
statistical analysis has been made on tens of thousands of 
randomly generated puzzles. It shows that they can solve 42% 
of the minimal puzzles (“minimal” means “has a unique 
solution and has several solutions if any entry is deleted”; 
statistics would be meaningless without this condition). 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
We have proposed a general conceptual framework for 
approximating a constraint satisfaction problem with 
constructive resolution theories in which the intuitive notion 
of a candidate is given a simple and well defined logical status 
with an underlying epistemic meaning. We have given a 
detailed illustration of these concepts with the Sudoku CSP. 
We have explained why a resolution theory, even though it 
seems to express all the constraints of the CSP, may not be 
complete. 
One may ask: is using a resolution theory more efficient 
(from a computational point of view) than combining 
elementary constraints propagation with blind search? In the 
Sudoku example, our simulations (see Part II) show that the 
answer is clearly negative; moreover, as there exist very 
efficient general purpose search algorithms, we think this 
answer is general. But, instead of setting the focus on 
computational efficiency, as is generally the case, our 
approach sets the focus on constructiveness of the solution. 
Another general question remains open: how “close” can one 
approximate a CSP with a well chosen resolution theory? We 
have no general answer. But, in Part II of this paper, we shall 
define elaborated resolution theories, give a meaning to the 
word “close” and provide detailed results for the Sudoku CSP. 
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